Understanding Justice: Criminal Courtroom Interpretation in Eighteenth-Century                London and Twenty-First-Century Toronto by Macfarlane, Karen A.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 












Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 06:22
271TTR a 20 ans / TTR Turns 20
Understanding Justice: Criminal 
Courtroom Interpretation in 
Eighteenth-Century London and 
Twenty-First-Century Toronto1
Karen A. Macfarlane
In a recent scathing statement, Mr. Justice Casey Hill of the 
Ontario Superior Court called the quality of interpretation in 
a Peel Region court “a critical threat to justice.” A 2005 article 
in the Globe & Mail exposed how the Ontario courthouse was 
failing the large, multicultural community of the Greater Toronto 
Area by providing witnesses and defendants with unaccredited 
and unqualified interpreters, some of whom were not fluent in 
the witness’s own language and were for the most part ignorant 
of Canadian legal terminology (Blatchford, 2005, A1). This 
article compares criminal courtroom interpretation in present-
day Toronto with that of another city which was composed of 
a large immigrant population—eighteenth-century London. 
Comparing these two metropolitan centres helps highlight the 
modern issue of access to adequate interpretation. Eighteenth-
century London, like Toronto, was home to peoples from all over 
1  Funding for this paper was provided by the now defunct Law 
Commission of Canada’s Nathalie Des Rosiers Audacity of Imagination 
Award. The 2006 theme was, “Diverse cities, cultural practices and 
the law.” An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 
Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences in a panel hosted by 
the Canadian Law and Society Association. I am grateful to Tommaso 
Leoni, Annick Chapdelaine, Dave Macfarlane, Roberto Perin, Daniel 
Simeoni, and Douglas Hay for their comments and support. 
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the world. Tens of thousands came to the city as a refuge, for 
work, and to live.2 The city faced similar difficulties to modern 
day immigrant cities: a multicultural population was also a multi-
lingual population.
This paper will use both legal and social history techniques 
to address the issue of language and the law. It will compare the 
need for interpreters and their function in eighteenth-century 
London and modern-day Toronto. For those for whom English 
was not their first language, the ordeal of a trial in a strange 
country was exacerbated by their inability to understand and 
express themselves in a foreign tongue. There were no clear laws 
or policies to deal with trial participants ignorant of English in 
early modern London. Ad hoc measures were used. In twenty-first-
century Toronto, Section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms protects the right of all deaf and allophone defendants 
to an interpreter. The most striking observation about criminal 
courtroom interpretation from the eighteenth to the twenty-first 
century is that not only do the same challenges persist, but that 
the attitudes of many Anglophones remain constant. The ideology 
and philosophy behind the criminal trial has radically changed; in 
the last three hundred years, the presumption of innocence, the 
law of evidence, and the right to legal counsel have developed 
to safeguard defendants. The competency of interpreters and the 
additional delay in court proceedings engendered by the presence 
of interpreters remain issues, but underneath this the basic 
assumptions of the Anglophone officers of the court have hindered 
progress. Judges, police, and lawyers continue to overestimate 
how much is being understood by non-native English speakers, 
and lack the necessary empathy for the latter’s situation.
1. Eighteenth-Century London
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, political, social and 
legal commentators drew connections between the nature of the 
2  Most of the immigrants came from Europe. There are only very 
general figures for the influxes, but in 1700 5% of London’s population 
was French Protestant. By mid-century there were between 5,000 to 
10,000 German gentiles, and by the end of the 1790s there were probably 
20,000 Jewish Londoners, mostly from Eastern Europe and speaking 
German, Polish, Yiddish, and Hebrew (Macfarlane, 2008, pp. 19-32). 
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English language and the nature of English law. Both valued 
common usage above established rules (Barrell, 1983, pp. 110-117). 
Nationalist writing about the importance and superiority of 
English echo in the debates about “Englishing” the laws (eg. 
Gentleman’s Magazine, 1733, pp. 65-66). Law courts used Latin 
and Law French, which seventeenth-century reformers believed 
kept laymen ignorant and under the control of corrupt lawyers. 
In 1731, Parliament promulgated a law to hold court proceedings 
in English. It cited the “perils (…) and mischief ” resulting from 
trials prosecuted in a foreign language, in this case Latin or Law 
French. The legislation would “protect the lives and fortunes of 
the subjects (…) from the peril of being ensnared or brought 
in danger by forms and proceedings in courts of justice, in an 
unknown language” (4 George II, c. 26). Beginning in 1733,3 all 
writs, indictments, informations, verdicts, and judgements, “shall 
be in the English tongue and language only, and not in Latin 
or French, or any other tongue or language whatsoever.” Like 
many lawyers, Sir William Blackstone was not a supporter of the 
legislation, and in his evaluation of the act, he stated that the law 
had not achieved its proposed ends, “Which purpose I fear, [has] 
not been answered; being apt to suspect that the people are now, 
after many years experience, altogether as ignorant in matters of 
law as before” (Blackstone, 1800, p. 322).
Part of the problem was that in the case of felony the legal 
procedure was designed to keep the defendant in ignorance. John 
Beattie has described prisoners as “men not used to speaking in 
public who suddenly found themselves thrust into the limelight 
before an audience in an unfamiliar setting—and who were for 
the most part dirty, underfed, and surely often ill” (Beattie, 1986, 
pp. 350-351) and therefore unable to mount any sort of coherent 
defence. There were few legal protections for those accused of 
felonies. The presumption of innocence, the use of legal counsel, 
and laws of evidence were developing in the later eighteenth 
century, but prisoners were at a severe disadvantage. Accused 
felons had no right to know the charge or evidence against 
them. John Langbein has referred to this as the “accused speaks” 
trial, because the purpose was to force the prisoner to explain to 
3  The Gregorian new year began 25 March 1733.
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the court how she or he could possibly be innocent (2003, pp. 
61-66). Most defendants were, not surprisingly, unable to express 
themselves clearly in this setting. For non-Anglophones, the 
situation was more dire still.
 Skilled interpreters were valued in the eighteenth 
century and used by the government and navy (Sainty, 1975, 
p. 62). Indeed, Levy Mortigem was prosecuted for posing as a 
government interpreter in order to “unlawfully and by false 
pretence” obtain money and the trust of a publican (OBP, 1807, 
(t18070114-103)). The Secretary of State appointed official 
interpreters to deal with official correspondence. Able interpreters 
were also used for diplomatic and commercial expeditions. When 
it came to criminal trials, however, interpreters were not viewed 
as valuable resources; they were the cause of delays and expense. 
This, combined with the English overestimation of the ability of 
foreigners to understand English, hindered the development of 
quality standards for courtroom interpretation. In proceedings 
involving people of social standing or with financial resources, 
more attention was paid to the issue of interpreters; it is therefore 
in these cases that the most information about eighteenth-
century interpretation can be found. There were two important 
exceptions to this general rule: the Admiralty and the empire. The 
cosmopolitan nature of the navy necessitated the integration of 
Europeans, Asians, and Africans, and the ability to comprehend 
them. Overseas, when the English were themselves the minority, 
careful attention was paid to translation.
There were few regulations about interpreters in 
most English courts. There were no fixed criteria about when 
interpreters should be used, how many, what quality, and how 
much should be translated. There were guidelines for foreign 
commissions and there were standard oaths which interpreters 
had to swear before testifying which were not specific to each 
court. The courts of King’s Bench, Chancery, Common Pleas and 
the Exchequer charged a 2 shilling fee for swearing interpreters 
for indictments and informations. One precedent was established 
for the function of interpreters in du Barré v. Livette. Agents of 
attorneys were held to hold the same position as counsel. If an 
interpreter was present during discussions between a client and 
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their attorney, then the interpreter could not testify about that 
conversation; Lord Kenyon concluded that the interpreter was 
“the organ of the attorney” (MacNally, 1802, p. 251). However, 
conversations between an interpreter and a prisoner were not 
privileged (Roscoe, 1846, p. 187).
In contrast to the civil law courts, the military and 
Admiralty courts had greater experience with non-Anglophones 
as defendants, witnesses, and even as judges at tribunals 
(McArthur, 1805, pp. 24-26, 330-332). There were rules about 
when interpreters were to be used and guidelines about their 
qualifications. Since many enlisted men and officers were of 
foreign birth, this attention is understandable. Ships often carried 
interpreters, or had someone on board who spoke multiple 
languages.4 Some Admiralty courts had official interpreters.5 At 
a 1726 trial for piracy, the judge not only appointed counsel for 
the prisoners and swore a captain to be their interpreter, but also 
made the captain available to the prisoners while the advocate 
prepared their defence (The trials of five persons for piracy, 1726, 
p. 28). At the trial of Viscount Sackville, the Judge Advocate 
instructed the interpreter to ascertain whether a French witness 
understood the oath and his duty as a witness, and to explain the 
laws of England in regard to testimony and perjury (Sackville, 
[1760], pp. 9-10, 141).
The guides and accounts of military courts show the 
greatest attention to the needs of non-Anglophones. The best 
and most careful reference to the role of interpreters is Lord 
Woodhouselee’s An essay on military law, and the practice of courts 
martial (1800). He considers ignorance of English as being 
analogous to standing mute to a charge:
In such case, it is necessary that a neutral person of ability and 
discretion, who is equally skilled in both languages, should be 
sworn, to interpret between the prisoner and the prosecutor 
4  Eg. in 1662, the Virginia Assembly appointed two interpreters, one 
for the Norwood (An abridgement of the laws, 1704, p. 34).
5  Eg. the High Court of Vice Admiralty of Jamaica ( Jamaica. Assembly, 
1792, p. 96).
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and court. This interpreter must, in the first place, explain to 
him distinctly the import and substance of the charge, and 
deliver to the court his answer to the accusation; and during 
the whole course of the trial, he must translate, for the benefit 
of the prisoner, the import of each of the witnesses, and put 
such questions as the prisoner shall suggest, either in the way 
of cross examination of the evidence for the prosecution, or 
directly as exculpatory proof. (Woodhouselee, 1800, pp. 241-
242)
A passage in John McArthur’s guide to naval and military courts 
likewise includes directives that the interpreter be a “disinterested 
person,” “skilled in his own language and that of the indictment,” 
who must swear:
You shall well and truly interpret and translate, in all cases 
in which you shall be applied to in the course of the present 
trial; and you shall not communicate or discover any person or 
persons any part of the proceedings, until the sentence to be 
pronounced shall have been approved by his majesty [or by the 
commander in chief ].6 (McArthur, 1805, p. 24)
These concerns about the quality of interpretation were not shared 
at the largest criminal court in England. London’s Old Bailey 
courthouse hosted hundreds of trials involving interpreters in the 
long eighteenth century. It is therefore the greatest resource for 
analysing the role of interpreters in criminal justice and will be 
the focus of this paper. 
1.1 Need for an Interpreter
The function of interpreters in the eighteenth-century criminal 
trial was to facilitate the routine proceeding of the court. It was 
most important to ensure that sufficient material was commu-
nicated to the judge and jury so that they could render their 
decisions. How well prisoners, witnesses, or even prosecutors 
could understand or be understood was of secondary importance. 
In the trials where clear direction is given to the interpreter(s), 
two methods appear to have been employed. When the court 
required interpretation, it was usual for testimony to be repeated 
6  The text in brackets did not apply to naval courts martial. 
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sentence by sentence. However, when the prisoner(s) could not 
understand English, it was the usual practice for the judge to 
instruct the interpreter to summarise the relevant evidence at 
the end of a witness’s testimony. The need for an interpreter was 
based on the needs and perceptions of Englishmen and what they 
thought necessary for understanding and for the trial to proceed. 
The judge was the ultimate arbiter of what was just, and could 
decide whether or not interpretation was necessary. When there 
was no interpreter for one prosecutor, he simply could not testify 
at the trial (OBP, 1787, (t17870523-91)). 
 
There was no fixed practice or procedure for how and 
when to employ interpreters. It was a more straightforward 
decision to secure the assistance of an interpreter when it was 
necessary for the court to understand a witness; “the party robbed 
could speak no English, and so obliged to have an Interpreter, 
that the Court might be sensible of his Evidence” (OBP, 1680, 
(t16800421-4)). Interpreters were often used when the quality 
of a witness’s English, or his accent, hindered understanding 
(OBP, 1751, (t17510417-24); OBP, 1751, (t17510523-47)). 
Though Frederick Benson of Hamburg understood English very 
well, he “talked it not very intelligible,” and so Christopher Gates 
repeated the testimony of the prosecutor, “sentence by sentence” 
for the court (OBP, 1751, (t17510417-24)). However, a lack of 
fluency in English did not automatically warrant the services of 
an interpreter. A Walloon prosecutor, “told his Story in scarce 
intelligible English,” but without any apparent assistance (OBP, 
1731, (t17310115-74)). Judges preferred that witnesses speak 
for themselves when possible (A complete collection of state-trials, 
1742, p. 28). 
It is difficult to assess whether foreign defendants could 
understand all or most of the proceedings against them. Some 
prisoners brought their own interpreters, but many were reliant 
on the court to identify the need to appoint someone to explain 
the events of the trial. Ignorance of English was no guarantee 
that an interpreter would be provided. Even though Jacob Canter, 
a German Jew, was represented by counsel at his trial, it was Mr. 
Akerman, the Newgate Prison turnkey, who informed the court 
that the prisoner required an interpreter. In this case, it is evident 
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that the trial testimony had already begun when an interpreter 
was appointed for the prisoner (OBP, 1789, (t17890603-67)).7
 
Contemporaries continually overestimated their own 
and other’s abilities to comprehend. When a prisoner appeared 
to be deaf and mute, a special jury was empanelled to investigate 
whether the defendant was deaf “by visitation of god” or whether 
this was a sign of contempt. Interpreters for deaf witnesses were 
questioned and tested on their ability to communicate with the 
testifier (Eg. OBP, 1786, (t17860111-30); see Bacon, 1832, 
p. 202). No similarly direct approach was taken with foreigners. 
However, often prosecutors, judges, or, when present, counsel, 
would attempt to establish that the prisoner was indeed much 
more comfortable with English than they had claimed. Not 
surprisingly, there were conflicting reports of prisoners’ abilities 
to communicate. The prisoner had a vested interest in appearing 
to be uncomfortable with the language, and the witnesses and 
prosecutors had equally biased reasons for overestimating the 
defendant’s fluency in English. 
The English were not the best judges of the linguistic 
ability of non-Anglophones. Trial testimony reveals that their 
willingness to accept that strangers understood English was often 
based on the flimsiest of evidence. Mary Sampson concluded that 
her prosecuter “spoke very good English, as I could understand 
him” (OBP, 1776, (t17760221-15)). In one trial, the defendant 
was served by a lawyer who, by cross-examination, revealed how 
unfounded was the prosecutor’s belief that one of the suspects 
was only pretending to be a foreigner, “and I heard the word No, 
from one to the other—I will not swear it was No—it seemed to 
be a signification of No—I do not know whether the negative 
term in the French language sounds like No” (OBP, 1827, 
(t18270913-51)). These responses betray the thought process 
which is repeatedly apparent—the suspicion that “foreigners” are 
pretending ignorance of English. It also reveals English ignorance 
of foreign languages.
7  Testimony in John Frederic Wol-Fel’s trial had also commenced 
when someone informed the court that ‘The prisoner says that he does 
not understand rightly, he is a German’ (OBP, 1794, (t17940115-1)).
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Though there was great concern in the court that 
foreigners should not receive undue sympathy or be able to delay 
proceedings or claim ignorance because of a language barrier, it 
must be kept in mind that the ability of foreigners to understand 
and to make themselves understood in the course of everyday life 
is not a fair basis by which to assess their ability to comprehend 
court proceedings. Ordinary Englishmen and women struggled 
to make even the most rudimentary of defences without counsel: 
Lewis Mackely could only muster, “It goes against me; I don’t 
know what to say for myself ” (OBP, 1763, (t17630706-21)). Most 
were uneducated and in fear for their lives. In such circumstances, 
it was difficult for native English speakers to articulate a response; 
the terrifying ordeal of a trial in a foreign country in a foreign 
language must have exacerbated difficulties in understanding. 
On many occasions testimony reveals that the prisoner had 
been able to communicate in English, although at trial they 
were serviced by an interpreter (Eg. OBP, 1765, (t17650522-
11); OBP, 1748, (t17480706-27)). This should not be attributed 
to disingenuousness. One foreign witness who appeared to be 
comfortably testifying in English was unable to state the time of 
day in English (OBP, 1790, (t17900416-1)). 
 
The routine probing of a prisoner’s ability to speak and 
understand English was based on deep suspicion and prejudice. 
One court reporter added in his commentary, “The Prisoner had 
forgot to speak English, having been a Week in Newgate but 
learn’d Roguery enough to cook up a Newgate8 Defence which he 
made by the help of an Interpreter” (OBP, 1717, (t17170606-7)). 
The shorthand taker at the Old Bailey was clearly outraged 
by the behaviour of the defendant Bernard Kentye Massip 
when a witness’s testimony revealed “it appeared he was not so 
great a Stranger to our Language as he pretended to be” and 
immediately presumed that “it’s possible he might flatter himself 
with hopes, that by such dilatory Proceedings he might tire out 
the Patience of the Court, and be discharged, to prevent a great 
deal of Trouble which must necessarily be the Consequence, 
if he was arraigned and convicted in such Manner as the Law 
directs on these Occasions” (OBP, 1727, (t17270517-39)). With 
8  Newgate was the prison located next to the Old Bailey courthouse.
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more lawyers appearing at the Old Bailey in the later eighteenth 
century, the interrogation of linguistic ability became more 
common and sophisticated. During a robbery trial, Mr. Knowlys, 
the counsel for the defence accused the Indian prosecutor of 
having colluded with his interpreter to receive the reward for a 
successful prosecution. He also implied that the prosecutor had 
been rehearsed by his interpreter (OBP, 1801, (t18010114-10)). 
Legal commentators were often quick to attach disingenuous 
motives to witnesses desiring the assistance of an interpreter: 
“A Welch witness who intends to give unfair testimony, always 
affects an ignorance of the English language, in consequence of 
which the effect of cross-examination is not only weakened by 
the intervention of an interpreter; but the witness has time to 
collect and prepare his answer” (Pothier, 1826, p. 225).
The antagonism towards interpreters can be partly 
explained by examining some of the early modern arguments 
concerning the reasons why prisoners in felony cases did not 
require counsel, and why lawyers were barred from presenting 
defences. Prisoners, if they could afford it, could consult a lawyer 
on points of law, but had to present their own defence and question 
prosecution witnesses on their own (Beattie, 1991, p. 221). Felony 
trials were questions of fact, not law; counsel had no place in the 
proceedings. The prisoner was supposed to be an informational 
source and his or her behaviour and ability to rebut the evidence 
against him or her was crucial to the decision-making of the jury 
and judge (Langbein, 2003, pp. 35-36). This emphasis on spoken 
testimony is evident in Sir Thomas Smith’s sixteenth-century 
description of criminal proceedings:
[they are] doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the 
Justices, the enquest,
the prisoner, and so manie as will or can come so neare as to 
hear it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may heare 
from the mouth 
of the depositors and witnesses what is saide. (Smith, 1982, 
p. 115)
In the early eighteenth century, William Hawkins elaborated 
on why it was so important for the defendant to speak for his 
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or herself: “the very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and 
Manner of Defense of those who are Guilty, when they speak for 
themselves, may often help to disclose the Truth, which probably 
would not so well be discovered from the artificial Defense of 
others speaking for them” (Langbein, 2003, pp. 35-36).
1.2. Expedience
Interpreters caused delays and expense. When testimony had to 
be repeated in a different language, it necessarily lengthened trials. 
Professional interpreters had to be paid for their time. In court 
proceedings where time and cost were not especial concerns, more 
attention could and was paid to interpretation. Frustration with 
the delay of waiting for an interpreter sometimes led to witnesses 
simply being dismissed. At the trial of one of the regicides in 
1660, the Court found a French witness’s testimony inscrutable; 
although an interpreter was sworn in, “But it being found difficult 
and troublesome, the Council waved [sic] his Evidence.” The 
witness actually protested that, “Me Lar, me can peak Englis-” 
only to be interrupted by the counsel, “No, no, pray sit down, we 
will examine other Witnesses” (5 Howell ’s State Trials 1128; A 
complete collection of state-trials, 1730, p. 357).
In matters involving people of high status, there was 
more consideration. This is readily apparent in the trial of Count 
Königsmarck and his three alleged accomplices for murder. 
The Count, because of his connections and money, was served 
by multiple interpreters, while George Borosky, the common 
soldier whose life was in the greatest danger, did not have a single 
interpreter who was fluent in his native Polish (9 Howell ’s State 
Trials 83). During the divorce case of the Duke and Duchess of 
Norfolk, the Lords deemed it fitting that the Duchess be granted 
her own interpreter for the foreign witnesses, and that the Duke 
should pay for his services. The proceedings were even adjourned 
until the following day (House of Lords Journal, 1700, vol.16, 
pp. 521-523, HL/PO/JO/10/6/4/1511). But most criminal 
trials did not involve defendants with such social or financial 
resources.
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1.3. Who Were They?
In the modern courtroom, the impact of trained, professional 
interpreters on a trial is considerable. In her monograph on 
modern-day courtroom interpretation, Susan Berk-Seligson 
discusses how the choice of active or passive verbs; the formality 
of the language chosen; the interpreter’s tone; and the ability to 
clearly make good word choices has an affect on how the testimony 
of a witness is received by the courtroom and jury (Berk-Seligson, 
2002, passim). This is not an anachronistic comparison because 
these same concerns must have been accentuated in a courtroom 
where professional interpreting was not established and the 
defendant or witness had to rely on the linguistic capabilities 
of men and women who could be complete strangers to them 
and incompetent. Although the length of interpreted testimony 
was considerably shorter in the eighteenth century, the same 
difficulties and vagaries of interpretation must also have held 
sway.
Unfortunately, there is not much evidence about the 
identities of the eighteenth-century women and men who served 
as courtroom interpreters. Some witnesses brought their own 
interpreters to court. At other times, it appears that bystanders, 
jurors, and other witnesses were used. Interpreters did not have 
to be neutral parties. They could be family members (OBP, 1796, 
(t17961130-19)), character witnesses (OBP, 1743, (t17430413-
52)), co-defendants, jurors, or most disturbingly, the principal 
witness against the person requiring their services. Mr. Lebat, 
a juror, interpreted the indictment for Christopher Smith, but 
after the jury was sworn, a Mr. Clenard undertook the task of 
interpreting between the court and the prisoner (OBP, 1743, 
(t17431012-16)). A juror was also sworn to interpret at Haagen 
Swendsen’s trial (14 Howell ’s State Trials 580).
Although Lord Woodhouselee had stated in his guide 
to military courts that the interpreter should be a neutral party, 
the practice at the Old Bailey was far removed from this ideal. 
Frequently, one interpreter served both the prosecutor and 
prisoner (OBP, 1748, (t17480706-27)). At the 1748 trial of Mary 
Porter for stealing caps from her mistress and selling them to 
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George Mattaire, the latter served as both the principal witness 
against Porter and as interpreter for her mistress, Mary Quinseck 
(OBP, 1748, (t17480526-26).
Often interpreters served as character witnesses. More 
disturbingly, the Marquis de Paleotti’s interpreter was also a 
witness against him. Near the end of his trial, after much abuse 
and protesting by the Marquis that the interpreter did not make 
an adequate “appearance” for him, a magistrate was induced to step 
in and serve the defendant (OBP, 1718, (t17180227-44)). There 
was no established rule about the impartiality of interpreters. Sir 
Nathaniel Johnson, who was serving as interpreter at the trial of 
Count Königsmarck and his alleged co-conspirators for murder, 
was accused by the prosecuting counsel of being “more like an 
advocate than an interpreter; he mingles interpreter, and witness, 
and advocate together, I don’t know what to make of him” (9 
Howell ’s State Trials 64).
There were professional interpreters who worked in 
London, but they were employed in translating commercial 
and diplomatic correspondence. There is some rare evidence 
of their use in criminal proceedings: in a 1798 treason trial, 
Elias Buzaglo testified that  “I have sworn very frequently to 
my translations before the Lord-Mayor, and other Justices” 
(OBP, 1798, (t17980214-70)). There is much more evidence 
of their participation in the nineteenth century, especially after 
the establishment of the Metropolitan Police and its attendant 
bureaucracy. Towards the end of the nineteenth century it is 
possible to track the concern of professional interpreters and 
foreign embassies that adequate and accurate interpretation be 
provided to foreign defendants, and it was in this period that the 
Old Bailey, now the Central Criminal Court, hired the firm of 
Mssrs. Flowerdew & Co. to serve as interpreters in England’s 
largest criminal court (MEPO 2/376). 
2. Modern Canada 
Legal and social developments have shaped the modern 
Canadian criminal trial. From the late eighteenth century, rules 
of hearsay and the law of evidence (Langbein, 2003, pp. 35-36), 
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the presumption of innocence (Beattie, 1986, p. 341; May, 2003, 
pp. 233-235; Smith, 2005, pp. 133-172, 191-200; Landau, 2005, 
pp. 173-190), and the right to defence counsel (Prisoner’s Counsel 
Act, 6&7 William IV, c. 114; Beattie, 1991, p. 221; May, 1998, 
pp. 183-207) were established. The common law countries cite 
Lord Reading’s 1916 judgement in R. v. Lee Kun ([1916] 1 K.B., 
pp. 337-345) to assert the right to an interpreter. This entitlement 
was enshrined as a constitutional guarantee in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. This first part of the 1982 constitution 
also assures fundamental justice, the right to competent counsel, 
and the presumption of innocence. The ideal of multiculturalism 
is likewise protected by the Charter in Section 27 - “This Charter 
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada.” In 
this climate, the expectations of the modern criminal justice 
system are much higher than even a century ago. Although there 
are constitutionally-mandated protections for prisoners, the same 
issues which affected interpretation in the eighteenth century 
remain in the twenty-first. This section will analyse how non-
Anglophones are treated at trial, and what effect interpretation 
has on their experience of Canadian criminal justice. 
Twenty-first century Toronto, like eighteenth-century 
London, expands and absorbs immigrants from around the 
world. Unlike its earlier counterpart, present-day Toronto 
promotes itself as a multicultural city, a concept which had no 
resonance three centuries ago. There is now a common law and 
constitutional right to an interpreter. Nevertheless, many of the 
same concerns and prejudices continue to influence the treatment 
of foreign defendants, be they judicial attitudes, time, expense, 
and the competency of interpreters. There is now a new concern, 
however, about the effect interpretation has on the course and 
outcome of criminal trials.
2.1. Common Law Right to Constitutional Guarantee 
The common law countries draw on Lord Reading’s 1916 decision 
in R. v. Lee Kun as the basis for modern principles of the right of 
foreign defendants to be served by an interpreter. In his landmark 
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decision, Lord Reading directed that when a foreign defendant 
“who is ignorant of the English language” appears in court:
the evidence given at the trial must be translated. (…) If he 
does not understand the English language, he cannot waive 
compliance with the rule that the evidence must be translated; 
he cannot dispense with it by express or implied consent, and it 
matters not that no application is made by him for the assistance 
of an interpreter. It is for the Court to see that the necessary 
means are adopted to convey the evidence to his intelligence, 
notwithstanding that, either through ignorance or timidity or 
disregard of his own interests, he makes no application to the 
Court. The reason is that the trial of a person for a criminal 
offence is not a contest of private interests in which the rights 
of parties can be waived at pleasure. (…) Every citizen has 
an interest in seeing that persons are not convicted of crimes, 
and do not forfeit life or liberty, except when tried under the 
safeguards so carefully provided by the law. (R. v. Lee Kun, 
[1916] 1 K.B., pp. 340-341)
Lord Reading asserted that the contemporary practice was,
 
In the case of a foreigner ignorant of the English language who 
is undefended no difficulty has arisen in practice. The evidence 
is always translated to him by an interpreter. The more difficult 
question arises when an accused foreigner, ignorant of the 
English language is defended by counsel and no application is 
made to the Court for the translation of the evidence. There is 
no rule of law to be found in the books on the subject, and as a 
result of inquiry which we have made since the argument, it has 
become clear that the practice of the Courts in this respect has 
varied considerably during the last fifty years. (R. v. Lee Kun, 
[1916] 1 K.B., p. 342)
Contemporary legal texts drew the principle that a foreign 
prisoner ignorant of English who is not defended by counsel 
must be served by an interpreter, and cannot waive this “rule”. 
However, in the case of a foreign prisoner who does have counsel, 
“the judge may dispense with translation, if the prisoner or his 
counsel desire it, and the judge is of the opinion that the prisoner 
substantially understands the nature of the evidence which is 
going to be given” (Taylor, 1920, p. 954; Gibson, 1919, p. 228).
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Lord Reading acknowledged that this standard might 
incur delays: “To follow this practice may be inconvenient in 
some cases and may cause some further expenditure of time; 
but such a procedure is more in consonance with the scrupulous 
care of the interests of the accused which has distinguished the 
administration of justice in our criminal Courts” (Gibson, 1919, 
p. 228).
Lord Reading’s decision was founded on the principle 
that an accused has the right to be present at his or her trial: 
“The presence of the accused means not merely that he must 
be physically in attendance, but also that he must be capable of 
understanding the nature of the proceedings” (R. v. Lee Kun, 
[1916] 1 K.B., p. 341). Canadian courts have used Section 650 of 
the Criminal Code of Canada which affirms that a defendant “shall 
be present in court during the whole of his trial” to uphold the 
right to an interpreter. Although Lord Reading’s statement has 
been cited throughout the common law countries as establishing 
this right, in this case Lord Reading ruled that even though Lee 
Kun had not been served by an interpreter at his trial, since Lee 
Kun had had an interpreter at a previous hearing where the same 
testimony was given, that a new trial was not in order. Lee Kun was 
therefore not afforded the same opportunity as an Anglophone to 
follow and be engaged in his own trial.
The second edition of Wigmore on Evidence applauded 
Lord Reading’s “enlightened opinion” which would redress the 
“Injustice done from time to time, in communities thronged 
with aliens, through failure of the judges to insist on a supply 
of competent interpreters” (Wigmore, 1923, pp. 89-91). In 
Wigmore’s discussion of the case he cites a Canadian appeal in 
which the majority held that there had been no substantial error 
when the cross-examination of one witness was not interpreted. 
Wigmore hailed the dissent in this decision of Graham E.J., “for 
a common official abuse in this country is to supply inadequate 
interpretation,” and suggested that “if the judges could be sent to 
a foreign country and there haled [sic] into court for crime, and 
made to feel the plight of an alien accused, some improvement 
might take place.”9 
9  The prisoners were Italians from Calabria. The interpreter could not 
speak their dialect. The trial judge instructed the interpreter to tell the 
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This common law right became a quasi-constitutional 
one by Section 2(g) of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights which 
recognised the “right to the assistance of an interpreter” (Steele, 
1992, p. 228). In 1982, Section 14 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guaranteed that “A party or witness in any 
proceedings who does not understand or speak the language in 
which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has the right 
to the assistance of an interpreter.” The Charter protects both 
the right of a defendant to understand his/her criminal trial and 
multiculturalism.10
2.2. Need
While the right to an interpreter is now established by precedent 
and by the Charter, the trial judge is still responsible for deciding 
if an interpreter is necessary and justified. There is no requirement 
that the judge inform all defendants that they have a right to 
an interpreter.11 The judge can examine the witness to evaluate 
if there truly is a need for an interpreter, and before the decision 
is made to allow the use of an interpreter, the witness may be 
examined by counsel on his/her linguistic capabilities. Once the 
use of an interpreter has been granted, there should be no more 
interrogation of the legitimacy of the need for one (Serrurier, 1983, 
pp. 656-660). However, the early modern practice of questioning 
a witness’s ability to understand English has persisted, as have 
the suspicions of Anglophones. While Anglophone mistrust 
of witnesses who choose or need to be examined through the 
medium of an interpreter remains, there have been important and 
enlightened rulings which protect the right to an interpreter. In 
prisoners ‘a purport of the evidence which I thought necessary.’ This 
was done for a direct examination, but the cross-examination was not 
interpreted at all (1 D.L.R. (1912), pp. 187-188; Wigmore, 1923, 
pp. 89-91).
10  Thorough discussions of the implications of the Charter are found 
in Morel, 1989, pp. 525-538 and Steele, 1992, pp. 218-251.
11  For an examination of how judicial recognition of the need for an 
interpreter affected proceedings in Illinois, United States of America, 
see Safford, 1977, pp. 15-30.
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1858, the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal ruled in R. v. Burke 
that questioning a witness who had requested an Irish interpreter 
on whether he had conversed in English with two men present 
in the courtroom was irrelevant and inadmissible. Christian J., 
writing for the majority:
when a witness who has succeeded in getting himself examined 
in Irish through an interpreter, and is thus gaining the advantage 
which arises to him from that course,—that where a witness 
who has done that, is proved, on some previous occasion to have 
spoken English, the inference is, that he is a dishonest witness, 
acting under a bias, and actuated by a desire to deceive the court, 
and if that were a necessary inference from the fact. (...) But is 
that a necessary inference from the fact of this witness having 
insisted on being examined in Irish? Are fraud and a desire to 
deceive necessary to explain what has taken place? And this is 
the point on which it seems to me the argument breaks down. I 
apprehend it is perfectly possible that the witness was actuated 
by an honest motive in wishing to be examined in Irish. He 
may have wished to express himself in the language which he 
knew best, in which he could most clearly express his thoughts. 
(R. v. Burke (1858); Phipson, 1892, p. 90) 
Despite this thoughtful decision, assigning disingenuous 
motives to witnesses who use interpreters continues. More than 
a century later, in a civil trial in Ottawa, the judge based part 
of his assessment of the plaintiffs’ credibility on his appraisal 
of their need for a French interpreter “I shall not comment on 
the evidence. Mr. and Mrs. Serrurier are both French speaking 
and gave evidence through an interpreter, although it was my 
observation that Mr. Serrurier had more than a passing knowledge 
of English. He answered on occasions before the interpreter had 
the question asked” (Serrurier, 1983, p. 657). The Ontario Court 
of Appeals granted the plaintiffs’ appeal of the judge’s decision, 
and Grange J.A. delivered the opinion that:
There is no doubt that the male plaintiff ’s first language was 
French. There is not a shred of evidence that he gave his 
evidence in that language for any other reason than that he 
was more comfortable in it. That he sometimes understood 
questions before they were translated (…) is in no way evidence 
of improper motive in testifying in French. The trial judge did 
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not say that he had reached that conclusion but the implication 
is there and I cannot be sure that it did not colour his whole 
approach to a very important—indeed decisive—issue, namely, 
the credibility of the plaintiff (...). ( Serrurier, 1983, p. 659)
 
In Roy v. Hackett, an Ontario Divisional Court judge 
concluded that the Constitution does not place limitations on 
the right to an interpreter, and that to allow “a discussion of 
the witness’s or party’s knowledge of the language in which the 
proceedings are taking place under the pretext of testing his 
credibility” would make “the very exercise of the right guaranteed 
by the Charter illusory and examination on the exercise of this 
right is in my view clearly ‘vexatious and oppressive’” (Roy v. 
Hackett, 1987, p. 419). However, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
concluded that in this arbitration hearing the questioning of the 
witness’s English skills had not impugned his credibility (ibid., 
p. 424). Despite these rulings, Anglophone officers of the court 
continue to believe that there are deceptive or dishonest pretexts 
for requests for interpreters. In his study on language bias in 
the criminal justice system, David J. Heller found that all the 
interpreters and lawyers he questioned believed that Metropolitan 
Toronto judges were extra-cautious and that interpreters were 
always furnished when asked for. Many of those he interviewed 
felt that some defendants might have wanted an interpreter 
to “hide behind” instead of out of genuine need (Heller, 1995, 
p. 362).
2.3. Standards
The quality of interpretation was the subject of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s 1994 decision in R. v. Tran. This important 
judgement assessed whether “the failure to provide the accused 
with full and contemporaneous translation of all the evidence at 
trial” constituted a breach of his “right to an interpreter” (R. v. 
Tran, 1994, p. 16). The Court set out how to determine if there 
had been a violation of the s. 14 guarantee of the Charter: “it 
must be clear that the accused was actually in need of interpreter 
assistance—i.e., that he or she did not understand or speak the 
language being used in court” (R. v. Tran, 1994, p. 31).
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At his trial for sexual assault, Tran’s court-appointed 
interpreter was asked to testify about the defendant’s weight 
at the time of the alleged attack. Contrary to the Court’s and 
defence counsel’s instructions, the interpreter spoke in English, 
and only summarised his own evidence at the end of his direct 
examination and after his cross-examination. There is no report 
that a subsequent conversation between the interpreter and the 
trial judge was even conveyed to the accused. The Supreme Court 
felt that,
the first step in the analysis will be to determine whether there 
was in fact a departure from the general standard of continuous, 
precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous 
interpretation guaranteed by s. 14 of the Charter. In my view, 
there is no doubt that the interpretation of the proceedings in 
which Mr. Nguyen was involved as a witness fell well below 
what it should have been. (...)[Author’s emphasis] (R. v. Tran, 
1994, p. 49)
This sets a high standard, and harkens back to the eighteenth-
century prescriptives in the military court guides by Lord 
Woodhouselee and John McArthur. The judgement in R. v. Tran 
also linked the right to an interpreter to the modern notion of 
cultural inclusiveness:
The right of an accused person who does not understand or 
speak the language of the proceedings to obtain the assistance 
of an interpreter serves several important purposes. First 
and foremost, the right ensures that a person charged with a 
criminal offence hears the case against him or her and is given 
a full opportunity to answer it. Secondly, the right is one which 
is intimately related to our basic notions of justice, including 
the appearance of fairness. As such, the right to interpreter 
assistance touches on the very integrity of the administration of 
criminal justice in this country. Thirdly, the right is one which 
is intimately related to our society’s claim to be multicultural, 
expressed in part through s. 27 of the Charter. The magnitude 
of these interests which are protected by the right to interpreter 
assistance favours a purposive and liberal interpretation of the 
right under s. 14 of the Charter, and a principled application of 
the right. (R. v. Tran, 1994, pp. 29-30) 
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2.4. Effect on Trial
The seminal work on the effects of interpretation on the modern 
courtroom is Susan Berk-Seligson’s The Bilingual Courtroom 
(Berk-Seligson, 2002). She experimented with interpretation 
before mock jurors and used 1982-83 tape-recordings of 114 
hours of judicial proceedings to analyse the effects of Spanish-
English interpretation in the United States. She had interpreters 
listen to the tapes and create their own transcripts, and compared 
the results with what had actually transpired in the courtroom. 
Beyond the basic concerns about the competence of courtroom 
interpreters, she argues that there are a host of issues and biases 
in play. Well-trained interpreters still affect the course of judicial 
proceedings.
Modern guides to criminal trials and studies of 
interpretation demonstrate that direct communication is still 
greatly prized. Interpreters are seen as obtrusive figures in the 
courtroom. Judges and attorneys often address questions to the 
interpreter instead of directly to the witness. This same behaviour 
was evident in the long eighteenth century. Berk-Seligson 
supports the above-described concerns that interpreters lessen the 
strength of cross-examination: “the interpreter unwittingly usurps 
some of the power of the interrogating attorney” (Berk-Seligson, 
2002, p. 96). Grange J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeals wrote 
in a 1983 decision that “It is, of course, a bastion of our system 
of jurisprudence that a witness be subject to cross-examination. 
Cross-examination becomes more difficult, and often less 
effective, when each question and answer must be interpreted. It 
is for that reason that a discretion is given to trial judges whether 
or not to permit the employment of an interpreter” (Serrurier, 
1983, p. 657). Interpreters also interrupt attorneys, which can 
adversely affect how those lawyers are viewed by jurors (Berk-
Seligson, 2002, p. 195).
Beyond the adequacy of interpretation, there still 
exist certain negative assumptions about witnesses who speak 
through interpreters. Susan Berk-Seligson has quite powerfully 
demonstrated that body language, word choice, the formality 
of the language, the use of hesitators, and a myriad of factors 
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influence people’s perceptions of witnesses. In an examination of 
shoplifting trials, David J. Heller found that criminal defendants 
who used interpreters were about twice as likely to receive a harsh 
sentence (Heller, 1995, pp. 352-354). Heller also found that while 
defence attorneys would not agree that courts were biased against 
defendants using an interpreter, they did think that employing 
one was a tough decision.
When David J. Heller interviewed interpreters in 
Metropolitan Toronto courthouses for his 1995 study, he found 
that they were “generally very highly educated” (Heller, 1995, 
pp. 359). However, the requirements to be a courtroom interpreter 
are far from stringent, and do not even include familiarity with 
legal terminology. Recently Mr. Justice Casey Hill of the Ontario 
Superior Court released a stinging judgement lambasting the 
state of interpretation at the courthouse in one of the most 
multicultural communities in Canada. Indeed, the Brampton 
courthouse leads the province in the use of interpreters, but from 
2001 to early 2005, unaccredited interpreters worked 2,670 days. 
Also, Mr. Justice Hill reported that once a Hindi interpreter 
was actually called to assist a Punjabi-speaking defendant. He 
thus fears that while judges can detect grossly incompetent 
interpretation, “it is statistically inevitable that there exist as-yet 
undiscovered miscarriages of justice” (Blatchford, 2005, A1).
Conclusion
In the eighteenth century, there were few protections for alleged 
felons. The focus of this “accused speaks” trial was the testimony 
of the defendants themselves, and their ability to offer adequate 
explanations to negate the evidence presented against them. 
While this surely placed prisoners at a remarkable disadvantage, 
non-Anglophones had a double handicap: not only did they 
lack fluency in English, but they encountered the suspicions 
engendered by Englishmen’s lack of empathy for their situation. 
The criminal trial has evolved into an adversarial contest between 
trained lawyers, and legal safeguards have been established to 
protect those accused of crimes. However, value is still placed 
on direct communication and being able to judge a witness’s 
credibility, both of which are hindered by the intervention of an 
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interpreter. This intrusion of an intermediary into the process 
remains an at times damaging hindrance.
In the twentieth century, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms enshrined the entitlement to courtroom 
interpretation in Canada. There is now a constitutional guarantee 
and common law precedents which protect twenty-first century 
non-Anglophone defendants. However, these safeguards are only 
effective if there is someone who recognises that the accused 
needs an interpreter, or has suffered on account of Anglophone 
prejudices, or has not fully understood the proceedings against 
him/her. Qualified interpreters are essential, but judges and 
attorneys must be aware of the special considerations their use 
creates. The situation at the Brampton courthouse reveals that 
non-Anglophone defendants are still at the mercy of Anglophone 
members of the court to ensure that they are indeed “present in 
court during the whole of [their] trial” and able to participate in 
their own defence (Criminal Code of Canada, section 650).
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ABSTRACT: Understanding Justice: Criminal Courtroom 
Interpretation in Eighteenth-Century London and Twenty-
First-Century Toronto — This paper compares criminal 
courtroom interpretation in present-day Toronto with eighteenth-
century London. Eighteenth-century London, like Toronto, was 
home to a large immigrant population, and faced similar challenges. 
This article argues that expedience was the most important factor 
in shaping eighteenth-century criminal courtroom interpretation. 
The right to an interpreter is now a constitutional and common 
law right. Modern defendants enjoy greater protections, such as 
the developments of the presumption of innocence, the law of 
evidence, and the right to legal counsel. However, the attitudes 
of many Anglophone trial participants remain unchanged and 
negatively affect defendants who use interpreters. 
RÉSUMÉ : Comprendre la justice : l’interprétation dans les 
causes criminelles devant les tribunaux de Londres au XVIIIe 
siècle et de Toronto au XXIe siècle — Cet article compare la 
situation de l’interprétation devant les tribunaux dans le Toronto 
contemporain à celle de Londres au dix-huitième siècle. À 
l’époque, Londres avait une population immigrante et faisait 
face à des défis similaires à ceux qu’affronte aujourd’hui Toronto. 
La commodité s’avérait le facteur le plus important régissant 
cette question. Le droit à un interprète est de nos jours un droit 
299TTR a 20 ans / TTR Turns 20
Understanding Justice
constitutionnel, ainsi qu’un droit de la common law. Les accusés 
aujourd’hui jouissent de protections plus étendues, telles que la 
présomption d’innocence, la loi de la preuve et le droit à un avocat. 
Toutefois, l’attitude inchangée des participants anglophones aux 
procès continue d’avoir un impact négatif sur les accusés qui ont 
recours à des interprètes.
Keywords: criminal law, history of interpretation, right to 
interpreter, quality of interpretation, London.
Mots-clés : droit criminel, histoire de l’interprétation, le droit à 
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